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ESSAYS

A "MORE EXCELLENT WAY":
MORAL IMAGINATION & THE ART OF JUDGING
LELAND

P.

ANDERSON*

The jury box is filling up again. That's where the prisoners
sit awaiting arraignment, pretrial dispositions, or sentencing. The
Deputy Sheriffs roll the prisoners from a door to the right. That
door leads to a small vestibule, three holding cells, and an elevator which descends to the tunnel beneath the courthouse. The
tunnel leads to Post 5, another holding area, equipped with its
own elevator which bears prisoners upward into the heart of the
jail. The system is designed to segregate prisoners from the general populace. As the prisoners are led in and out of the courtroom, they are hand-cuffed. The ones who have caused trouble
at the jail, tussling with the guards or spitting at them, shuffle
into the courtroom with leg shackles and belly-belts in addition
to the handcuffs. I have seen belly-belts on gang-bangers and a
variety of other "clients with attitude" who pose a flight risk. Even
if someone entertained the forlorn hope of breaking for the
double doors at the back of the courtroom, they would not get
far. Short of leaping from a fifth floor window (not likely), the
only way to the ground floor from Division 2's fifth floor courtroom was a bank of public elevators. The deputy-sheriff-sponsored welcoming party at the Lobby level would discourage all
but those attempting SBC. 1
I have never figured out how a person in custody could
escape this courthouse. The in-custodies wear bright international-orange colored jumpsuits, making them highly visible
targets either in the bubbling stew of the courthouse or in the
vacant outlands beyond. The courtrooms are under continual
surveillance. The deputies in charge of security have a sixth sense
* Judge Leland P. Anderson served ten years as a District CourtJudge in
Jefferson County, Colorado. He now serves as an arbiter and mediator with
Judicial Arbiter Group, Inc., Denver, Colorado.
1. "SBC" is street parlance for "suicide by cop."
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for trouble. To the best of my knowledge nobody required to stay
on the premises has succeeded in averting those obligations.
I emphasize these matters because in the first instance, a
courtroom is a place of restraint, a place where movement is
restricted, where freedom is curtailed, where human desire is discouraged. It's a compressed place, a place of diminished action,
diminished choices, and to a certain extent diminished vision. In
a place such as this, a premium is placed on safety, restraint, and
efficiency. To a far lesser extent, does the judicial system give
ground to wisdom, passion, and creativity? In such an environment, restraints on movement and freedom are translated into
constraints on deep understanding and imagination.
The total number of cases assigned to my division was
between three and four hundred. The system pressure was enormous. Cases gushed into Division 2 as if the valves on both faucets were broken. The unstated goal was to push the cases
downward toward the drain, to force them toward resolution, so
as to avoid filling the public tub to overflowing. The judge had to
keep an eye on "the numbers," the number of open cases on the
docket. If "the numbers" got away from a judge, lawyers were
likely to run into a thirty-minute voir dire and a fifteen-minute
closing argument. Otherwise, the chronic state of overflow in a
Division's docket would invite scrutiny by the bean-counter statheads on the judicial performance commission.
On this particular morning, my tub was looking dangerously
full. The courtroom was packed with deputy district attorneys,
public defenders, probation officers, prisoners, and spectators. I
felt as though a vast parade of clowns, hooligans, drummers, and
buglers had been funneled into my courtroom to rupture the
pipeline at the joints. Felony docket day in a busy metropolitan
courtroom can be anything but austere and decorous. At best it
resembles organized chaos. At worst, it is chaos. The public
defenders were huddled with the deputy district attorneys trying
to work out last minute deals. Private defense counsel hovered in
the background awaiting their chance to intervene, to get a little
time with the prosecutors. Only the most pushy and aggressive
private counsel dared to step between the public defenders and
the prosecutors. With the most ridiculous caseload in the courthouse and the least amount of time to meet their clients and
secure a deal, the public defenders required first shot at the Deputy D.A.s and the judge. They worked feverishly with the prosecutors in hushed and not-so-hushed conversations. In the cramped
intensity of the moment, fingers would point, files would be
slapped down hard on counsel table, and fists would begin to
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curl as the slithering monster docket began to uncoil itself and
rattle with fury.
Spectators in the back of the courtroom watched the hissing
flood of activity before them in dumb silence. Some of them
were on bond, waiting to meet their public defender for the first
time. Others were family members or friends of the prisoners
crammed together in the jury box. A few were simply curious, the
people I call courtroom rats, who spend their days wandering
from one courtroom to another looking for the vicarious excitement of someone else's misadventures with the law.
In addition to being a place of physical restraints, the courtroom is a time-constrained environment. Time is the stubborn
creature stalking the docket minute by minute, pointing insistently at the clock. How much time do we have? How many cases
do we have left? I glanced toward the clock on the wall at the
back of the courtroom. I had been waiting twenty minutes for
counsel to reach last minute agreements. Already 1:30 P.M., and
I still had not called the first case of the afternoon. I felt a rush of
anxiety. I tried to breathe slowly, knowing that once I started calling the docket I would be in for five to six more hours of intensity trying to move the cases forward and give counsel and the
parties their five-minute "day in court." I expected I would go
through three cups of coffee and a quart of water before it was
over. In the end, when I stood to leave the bench, my knees and
back would groan and squeak like rusted steel as I stepped down
to go to chambers. I wanted to push hard through the afternoon,
get it done. I doubted my reporter would get a mid-afternoon
break despite the ache in her arms from the immense effort of
reporting a ninety-case docket. I would again watch her shake
out her hands and arms between case calls trying her best to
hang in there.
The afternoon docket was off to a slow start. The lawyers
were not ready, fumbling with their papers, scrambling to broker
last-minute plea-deals. I knew if I pushed it too fast, the lawyers
would beg for more time, and the case might be set over to jam
another day's docket. If I waited too long, I would be working
into Monday evening. I had been through the routine innumerable times. I know many judges hammer the lawyers and bristle
with impatience if the lawyers aren't ready when the case is
called. I was never that kind of judge. I just didn't have it in me
to fight the time-battle with lawyers. I figured if I was going to
demand precision timeliness from them, I would have to
demand it of myself. I was a fairly prompt judge, but when I left
the Marine Corps I swore I wasn't going to be ruled again by a
life of military-like precision. I also knew realistically that if every
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judge in the courthouse demanded exacting timeliness from
counsel, the system would virtually explode. The public defenders and deputy D.A.s were often scheduled simultaneously in two
or three different courtrooms. Not even the most creative trial
lawyer can be two places at the same time. The system requires a
safety valve, a couple judges who were willing to relieve system
pressure by patiently waiting for counsel to complete their business in other courtrooms before appearing in the judge's own
courtroom. I had no desire to compete with my colleagues for
some combat-commander award in the courthouse. I elected
myself to the job of relief valve. Attorneys understood they would
not face the hot breath of judicial hell if they arrived a few minutes late in my courtroom or needed an extra few minutes to talk
with opposing counsel. I suppose some would argue my ship
wasn't tight enough because I endured tardiness and allowed
counsel to open their briefcases on counsel table. I was more
interested in throwing energy into solving problems than thinking of new ones the attorneys would have to solve. I excused my
lassitude by bragging that we ran a user-friendly courtroom. No
doubt more than a few people have concluded I was merely
"used."
I sat with my elbows propped on the bench, my hands folded
under my chin. I waited for the clamor of conversation between
lawyers, probation officers, police officers, and witnesses to die
down, signaling that deals have been struck or final lines drawn
in the sand. Now began the long lamentation of the law. As the
high priest in the sanctuary, I commenced to advise the mangled
masses of their constitutional rights. In liturgical fashion I
uttered the constitutional formulations covering a bewildering
assortment of crimes. The criminal charges encompassed an
even more bewildering range of human behaviors which could
only cause one to conclude, "What were they thinking?"
Bundles of case files were shoveled up to the bench. The
first cases were called, and the attorneys entered their appearances, after which I asked, "How do you wish to proceed?" We
began the long march into the afternoon. Lawyers fidgeted and
paced at the back of the courtroom, impatient to be on their way.
I sensed their urgency as they were required to listen to the sleepinducing recitation of rights and warning given to each accused
as pleas were taken or speedy trial rights waived.
One person in the courtroom seemed oblivious to it all. She
sat in the jury box with the other prisoners brought from the jail.
I noticed her from the corner of my eye. She was leaning forward, looking around as if she was about to call for help, but she
remained silent. Her face was red, and tears were falling down
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her cheeks. She made no noise, not even a sniffle. No one paid
attention to her. Tears are not uncommon in a courtroom. The
wheels ofjustice grind inexorably forward regardless of tears. She
sprawled backward in her chair, and finally stared without emotion at the blank wall on the far side of the courtroom. No one
wipes another's tears in the jury box. She wiped her own and
sank into her own thoughts. That was a good sign. Tears threaten
decorum and order. They create imbalance. They can cause
delays. With a ninety-case docket, two to three minutes per case is
the best you can afford if you want to get home for dinner.
By mid-afternoon, I was almost to the point of physical suffering. I had taken a dozen pleas, each one meticulously and
carefully scripted to assure a reviewing court the defendant's plea
was free, voluntary, and not the result of undue influence or
coercion. To the acolytes of the law carrying out their duties in
this rough and tumble sacristy, the words suffuse with meaning
and consequence. To the uninitiated, including the defendants
themselves, the words were so much "mumbo-jumbo." The
tedium of the formalities brought world-weariness to the proceedings. As the afternoon passed, however, the deadly monotony was increasingly lanced occasionally by outbursts from one
side or another as the lawyers became impatient with each other
or with me. They were reaching that point where being a prosecutor or being a public defender was in and of itself a moral
error in judgment. Ad hominem attacks broke out like back-alley
brawls as the docket vaulted into the second half of the afternoon. Tempers flared in flash-bang spontaneity. Ragged-mouth
arguments emanating from the bowels rather than the brain
exacted a toll on the court reporter who glanced fiercely in my
direction as if to say, "Aren't you going to do something about
this?"
For whatever reason, I declined to take control. I let it roll,
strangely fascinated by the lawyers going at it hammer and tong,
risking the chance that in a phrase or a word they might find
themselves in custody being booked and printed on a contempt
charge. The fierceness of the arguments and raw-gut emotions
caused me to allow things go further than they reasonably
should. I reached for the peacemaker, an eight-inch-long walnut
gavel. I wasn't a gavel judge, but I knew if I used it, the world
would stop spinning on its axis, and everything would go to
freeze-frame, lawyers stopping mid-word, as the crash of the gavel
all but took out the P.A. system in the courtroom. I lifted the
gavel, but when I did, the sound and fury of the debate ended as
quickly as a summer thunderstorm. The attorneys slunk back to
their chairs sullenly, glowering at each other, surrendering to the
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clock on the wall, waiting for another day to fully bleed their
opponent. They stared defiantly at me, waiting for the censure
from the bench.
I did my best to look cold and implacable, saying nothing. I
made a fast call on the issue, a shot from the hip, made without
reflection, a "ready, fire, aim" call. I locked in the glare of the
lawyer against whom I was making the call and delivered the ruling like a straight punch to the jaw, daring him to even think
about asking me to reconsider. The lawyer sensed my impatient
wrath and retreated like a cuffed dog to the corner. The theatrically cold assuredness of my ruling belied what I felt underneath:
an overwhelming sadness, an ache which saturated the tissues of
my soul like an ink stain.
The woman prisoner in the jury box stared dully at the wall.
I paid little attention to the box of in-custodies. I waited until
their case was called and they were yanked to the middle of the
courtroom to stand beneath a glaring overhead spotlight and
face the judge. Standing beneath that spotlight, I am sure many
of them barely understand or even hear the words of their lawyers or the judge. I know many leave the courtroom, hustled back
to their jail cells having little or no idea what just occurred in
court. They simply throw their trust and future like a heavy sack
of groceries into the hands of their lawyer and follow the whispered commands of counsel: "Yes, your Honor;" "No, your
Honor." Many of them have no idea why they are saying "Yes" or
why they are saying "No." They dread the public spotlight and
only wish it all to be done. Ordinarily, in a matter of moments, it
is done. In less than five minutes, they have had their "day in
court." They are hastened through the door in the wall, back to
the jail where they are either bonded out, released to probation,
detained for further proceedings, or transported to the penitentiary. Through that process, they may stop to ask themselves,
"How did I get here?" That question, however, is rarely asked in
the courtroom.
The female prisoner was called from the jury box. Unlike
the male prisoners, women prisoners were clothed in fire-engine
red jumpsuits. I watched as she left the jury box ambling to the
lectern beneath the spotlights. I glanced at the register of
actions, taking into account the fact that she had appeared
before me more than a dozen times in the past: a jury trial, probation violations, pick-ups on arrests, bond settings, and other
matters. She had been convicted of drug possession charges. I
had placed her on probation, but she had already busted probation twice and had written me a letter asking me to just send her
to prison. She was before me on another probation violation cou-
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pled with a new drug charge. The system had given her all the
breaks she deserved. Pleading guilty to the neW charge, she was
looking at serious penitentiary time. She essentially said she had
no intention of working a drug program. Her lawyer, sporting a
wrinkled suit coat and coffee-spotted tie, stood by her side. I
expected him to enter a "not guilty" plea on his client's behalf
and move to set her matter for hearing, if for no other reason
than to delay the inevitable.
As her lawyer began to say, "Not guilty," the defendant nudged him and whispered loudly, "No." The two of them turned
their backs to the bench and huddled a few minutes whispering
excitedly to each other. Her lawyer finally turned to me in exasperation and said, "Your Honor, I need a continuance. My client
wants to go to prison. She won't listen to me." The defendant
looked at me imploringly.
'Judge, I mean no disrespect. You don't have time for this,
and I don't either. I just want to plead guilty and get it over. I
need to go to prison."
This caused a rumbling from the spectators at the back of
the courtroom like someone shaking out a dusty blanket. I
silenced them with a wave of my hand, looked at the defendant
and said, "Maybe you should take some time to think about this."
She gazed at me with dull shark-like eyes. "I don't need any
more time, Your Honor. I know what I'm doing. Nobody's forcing me to do anything."
I gaped at her attorney who stepped back shrugging his
shoulders as if to say to me, "She's all yours, Judge. Good luck."
Ordinarily, I would have refused a plea from a defendant who
seemed at such odds with her own attorney. I would have
ordered a continuance for a couple of days as a cooling-off
period to give the defendant some time to think about what she
was doing. This time, however, at the end of a long and mindnumbing docket, I felt marked sympathy for the defendant's
sense of complete resignation and surrender.
"Very well, then. I'm open to taking her plea if that's what
she wants to do. Has counsel advised the defendant of her
rights?" Her lawyer responded affirmatively. Despite that, I cautiously went through the plea with the defendant inquiring as to
her health, education, emotional well-being, and the numerous
other inquiries requisite to formal acceptance of a probation violation admission. I accepted the defendant's admission that once
again she had violated the terms and conditions of her probation. All that was left was sentencing. I already had a complete
pre-sentence report from previous hearings. No further delay was
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necessary, and the defendant herself was not only resigned to
prison time, she was asking for it.
' Your Honor," she said in her statement of allocution, "I am
tired of coming in front of you. I am tired of sitting in courtrooms. I am tired of running. I can't do it anymore. Ijust want to
go to prison and have you all just leave me alone."
Her attorney had little to add to that "inspired" argument.
The defendant was an obvious candidate for prison. She had
been on the run from probation for over a year. In that time, she
had been without work, supporting herself by dealing drugs and
living with the head of a local motorcycle gang. I had already
sentenced her husband to ten years in the penitentiary, a
mandatory sentence imposed by reason of the quantity of drugs
he had been distributing. The defendant herself had injected,
swallowed, and snorted almost every illicit street drug available
and had settled on methamphetamine as her drug of choice.
"Meth" had brought her to her knees begging to be warehoused
in the penitentiary.
The prosecutor with a broad paternalistic smile recognized
that the prey was deep within the trap and all that was required
was for the judge to slip the lock through the hasp. He held his
hands out as if to say, "What more can I say?" He said little.
' You have no choice, your Honor. Your hands are tied. She
brought this on herself and gives you no alternative. It's time we
give this defendant a firm message: 'No more.' I know it, you
know it, and she knows it. She has been coddled by the system for
three years, and she's just snubbed her nose at us. She doesn't
believe me. She doesn't believe you. She doesn't believe any of
us. Judge, she needs to go away for a long time. She doesn't want
to help herself. There's nothing more we can do. It's time to say
'enough.' I know that, and you know that. I'm asking you to send
her to the Department of Corrections."
My gaze rolled from the prosecutor to defense counsel. One
more card could be played. I inquired if the defendant was
requesting community corrections, a community-based half-way
correctional facility imposing an initial term of lock-down for
inmates but gradually lifting restrictions upon completion of
drug programs and other incentives which would allow them to
matriculate into the community. The defendant spoke up.
"No way, your Honor. That won't work for me. I can't do any
more drug treatment. I'll just be back in front of you on another
charge. It's ridiculous. Just let me do some time and be done
with all this." Her plea reminded me of the fellow who begged
me to sentence him to prison so he could smoke cigarettes and
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eat a chicken sandwich. The local jail was a smoke-free environment, and apparently they didn't serve chicken sandwiches. I
accommodated him. Now I was on the cusp of granting this
female defendant's wish. Most people in the courtroom expected
me to give her somewhere between two and four years together
with a mandatory period of parole.
I looked at the clock, gripped the handle of the gavel wanting to throw it through the wall of the courtroom. The case had
already taken far longer than I had expected. Lawyers were looking at their watches. The court reporter was sighing audibly. Everyone was feeling depleted, exhausted, and bone-weary. I just
wanted to get done with the madness. My time and patience were
running on fumes. Push her through the door in the wall. Get it
done. Now.
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke
described the obliteration of civil society by the revolutionaries:
All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off.
All the superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of
a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our
naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our
own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd,
and antiquated fashion.
On this scheme of things, a king is but a man; a queen
is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal
not of the highest order. All homage paid to the sex in
general as such, and without distinct views, is to be
regarded as romance and folly....
On the scheme of this barbarous philosophy, which is
the offspring of cold hearts and muddy understandings,
and which is as void of solid wisdom, as it is destitute of all
taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by their
own terrors, and by the concern, which each individual
may find in them, from his own private speculations, or
can spare to them from his own private interests. In the
groves of their academy, 2at the end of every visto, you see
nothing but the gallows.
Edmund Burke described a country devoid of the wisdom of
the ages, a land savaged by violence and passion, a place, but for
the absence of bloodshed, similar to courtrooms where I have
served for ten years. The courtroom can be a violent place. At
2. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
(J.C.D. Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790).

IN FRANCE

239-40
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one extreme, I have presided over the state-sanctioned violence
of death penalty cases. Other kinds of violence evolve in a courtroom as well. The other kind is less organized, less prescriptive.
This is the violence inherent in the metaphor which stands at the
heart of the American system of justice: the adversarial system.
At best, the adversarial system implies sportsmanlike competition on a level playing field. At worst, the adversarial system suggests something just short of blood-letting where the combatants
seek to destroy the opponent by any means possible inasmuch as
the ends are often deemed to justify the means. The courtroom
generates the same fight-or-flight reflexes the ancients experienced when confronted by a saber-toothed tiger. The old reptile-brain coils or strikes in fear in reaction to zealous arguments
and cunning deceits.
Though a more quotidian battle than one fought with bullets and bombs, the adversarial process invites and stirs a heightened level of psychic or emotional disruption and violence. The
ultimate goal is to vanquish the opposition and achieve complete
victory. Litigation and trial-craft are in fact substitutes for blood
violence. In The Iliad, Homer describes a scene emblazoned on
the shield of Achilles. At the center of the shield a man stands
before a jury of citizens who must decide the blood price the
man must pay for taking the life of another man.3 In this
Homeric passage reflecting incidents occurring three thousand
years ago, we learn that humankind has used the trial process as
a substitute for blood violence since the dawn of history.
Our adversarial court system is steeped in metaphorical violence. Trials are figurative war zones where adversaries square off
in a hostile environment. Lawyers are called "gun-slingers" or
"Rambos." Trial preparation rooms are called "war rooms." Lawyers "go for the jugular" with "killer cross-examinations" and
"devastating closing arguments." The adversarial model invites
the language of war and violence into the courtroom. Humiliation, embarrassment, and disgrace are frequently advanced as
laudable goals in trial.
At the center of this struggle, the judge orchestrates the war
clothed in the black robes of the Law. In truth, I abhor conflict
and controversy. I was raised in a home where arguments and
conflict were discouraged. I was to "avoid fights at all cost" and
''stay out of trouble." The ethical imperatives from my religious
training were: "turn the other cheek," "forgive seventy times
seven," "blessed are the peacemakers." On my first day as ajudge,
3. See HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. 18, 11.478-508 (Rodney Merrill trans., Univ.
of Michigan Press 2007).
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I taped a small quotation to the bench, visible only to myself, as a
reminder of who I was and what I believed. The quotation was
from I Corinthians, chapter 23: "[A]nd yet shew I unto you a
more excellent way." 4 I cannot say that I knew or understood
how to show anyone a "more excellent way," but I wanted to challenge myself to seek a more excellent way in my comments and
demeanor on the bench.
After ten years on the bench, I question whether I managed
to discover or demonstrate a "more excellent way" in the course
of my work. Perhaps the challenge I posted for myself was one
largely within the confines of my own heart. Nevertheless, I
found myself pushed daily into circumstances where in Edmund
Burke's words, "[a] 11 the decent drapery of life [was] rudely torn
off," and I was left with nothing to cover the defects in my own
"naked shivering nature" to resolve the multifaceted hatreds and
deceits springing from the cloying appeals of lawyers and the
fleeting glimpses of truth snatched from the witness stand. I felt
paralyzed in the face of the "cold hearts and muddy understandings" which accompanied the so-called "pursuit of truth" in the
courtroom.
At times truth itself was on trial, a myth to be "exploded as a
ridiculous, absurd, and antiquated fashion," and beneath the
bright overhead spotlights humankind was exposed as little more
than an animal, "and an animal not of the highest order." I
winced as I saw lawyers roughly advancing the application of laws
"by their own terrors," people following laws not because they
comported with age-old notions of human dignity and moral
understanding but simply because the laws threatened restraint,
graduated levels of force leading eventually to the ultimate sanction of death. Laws then were to be obeyed not because they
reflected a common understanding concurrent among a community of citizens but because they threatened the individual with
particularized forms of oppression and duress.
Burke complained, "[L]aws are to be supported only by
their own terrors, and by the concern which each individual may
find in them, from his own private speculations, or can spare to
them from his own private interests."5 In this sense, the Law represents little more than an exercise in power, and the judge is
empowered in the end to act with coercive force, obliging litigants to pay penalties, to pay fines, to pay judgments, to pay with
their lives if the circumstances warrant. If a miscreant disobeys
the law, a judge may order the person hand-cuffed, taken from
4.
5.

1 Corinthians 12:31.
BURKE, supra note 2, at 240.
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the courtroom, and transported to live for a term of years in the
stone and steel of a penitentiary. This is the subtext of power,
physical and psychic violence which underlies the American system of justice, every vista ending in an act of coercion or force.
In searching for "a more excellent way," an approach
whereby the vista does not necessarily end in acts of coercion or
force, the Law offers few options. What if we were to reach into
Burke's wardrobe of the "moral imagination" and find robes cut
from different cloth? Russell Kirk suggests the "moral imagination" is that "which informs us concerning the dignity of human
nature, which instructs us that we are more than naked apes."6 In
Burke's words, without moral imagination, we are "cast forth...
from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and
fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord,
vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow."7
I know that the Law is premised in the first instance on reason and order, but as a refugee from the front-lines, I would
modestly suggest that the Law's reasons and orders are often
rationalizations and justifications where a targeted end result
supplants concerns about how that result is achieved. The socalled moral and constitutional imperatives of the Law become
more on the order of "muddy understandings" when lawyers or
judges become enmeshed with the results of the litigation
instead of the process by which the ends, whatever they may be,
are achieved.
The public ordinarily perceives the ideal judge as one who is
quite capable of discerning truth from falsity, right from wrong,
and good from evil. I doubt this has ever been the case, but in
our postmodern, post-Woodstock judiciary, I suspect that I am no
different from most of my colleagues in sharing a seeming indifference to classical wisdom and literature. From this indifference
springs a disability in apprehending stoic-inspired Roman jus natural or the contributions to notions ofjustice contained in works
such as Aquinas' Summa Theologica or canons of thought such as
those of the School of Salamanca. T.S. Eliot said, "The number
of people in possession of any criteria for discriminating between
good and evil is very small," but that "the number of the half-alive
hungry for any form of spiritual experience, or for what offers

6. Russell A. Kirk, The Moral Imagination, 1
(1981).
7.

BuRKE, supra note 2, at 261.
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itself as spiritual experience, high or low, good or bad, is
considerable.
My years on the bench taught me that distinguishing good
and evil, right and wrong, has been freeze-dried to looking at the
black-letter of legislative or constitutional law, and in cartoon-like
simplification claim, "They means what they says, and they says
what they means." In anyone's strict construction of the law, can
right and wrong be read plainly from the text? Human conduct
in its multiple expressions defies, at times, the black-letter exposition of the law. Words are incapable of completely defining the
vagaries of human behavior, thought, and intent. As Lewis Carroll notes, "'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things." 9 Many issues as well as behaviors
fall between the black lines of the law into the white void of interpretation and imagination. In that thin, flat, white void judges
have often found themselves at the mercy of the public, the
press, and the internet blogs wherein moral imagination is narrowed to the view of the gallows.
Russell Kirk instructs that "the end of great books is ethical-to teach us what it means to be genuinely human."1 I
would like to believe that is the end of the Law as well, to teach
us what it means to be genuinely human. In my mind, to be genuinely human, moral imagination should inspire us to see at the
end of Law's vista something more than coercion, force, and obedience. On the other hand, the Law should not embody the contrary contemporary ethic implying that one may do as one
pleases, as long as it doesn't hurt anyone else. Our laws should
embody a vision larger than one of self-righteous narcissism. The
positive law is drained of ethics inspired by the wisdom of the
sages and the truth of the ages. This dearth of deep ethical
reflection in the law leaves many who seek justice in the courtroom "half-alive hungry for any form of spiritual experience" in
the process. I have seen many people trapped by the jaws of
addiction, poverty, and educational disability. In most instances,
I suspect that the root cause of their problems is spiritual in
nature. Courts, however, are not equipped to provide "spiritual"
assistance. Spiritual wisdom, nevertheless, lies near the heart of
the moral imagination, and moral imagination is essential to
define our humanity, "to teach us what it means to be genuinely
"8

8. T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS 66-67 (1934), quoted in Kirk, supra
note 6, at 39.
9. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1871), reprinted in
ALICE IN WONDERLAND, at 163 (DonaldJ. Gray ed., W.W. Norton 1971) (emphasis added).
10. Kirk, supra note 6, at 40.
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human." The task then is to explore those avenues whereby
moral imagination may be accessed in the courtroom, despite
our postmodern predilection to divorce legal validity from
ancient notions of morality and justice.
The term "moral imagination" has been variously used to
signify a number of different things.'1 Among the gifts described
in connection with "moral imagination" is the ability to see more
than meets the eye. Vigen Guroian describes the moral imagination as "a power of perception, a light that illumines the mystery
that is hidden beneath visible reality: it is a power to help 'see'
into the very nature of things."1 " Paul Lederach suggests the
necessity of the creative act in moral imagination, "the capacity
to give birth to something new that in its very birthing changes
our world and the way we see things."" Lederach is deemed by
many to be one of the world's foremost experts on peacebuilding
and reconciliation.' 4 Lederach offers that "moral imagination
has a quality of transcendence. It breaks out of what appear to be
narrow, shortsighted, or structurally determined dead-ends."' 5
Lederach does not posit that the moral imagination is the "commodity or exclusive realm of a particular religious belief, much
less religious establishments or systems,"' 6 and he cautions
against morality becoming "prescriptive dogma, creating moral
stasis."" On the other hand, he explains moral imagination as
11. See, e.g., DALE C. ALLISON, THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT: INSPIRING THE
MORAL IMAGINATION (1999); SUSAN E. BABBITT, IMPOSSIBLE DREAMS: RATIONALITY, INTEGRITY, AND MORAL IMAGINATION (1996); CHRISTOPHER CLAUSEN, THE
MORAL IMAGINATION (1986); VIGEN GUROIAN, TENDING THE HEART OF VIRTUE:
How CLASSIC STORIES AWAKEN A CHILD'S MORAL IMAGINA1ION (1998); JOHN
PAUL LEDERACH, THE MORAL IMAGINATION (2005); CAROL A. NEWSOME, THE
BOOK OFJoB: A CONTEST OF MORAL IMAGINATIONS (2003); MARTIN PRICE, FORMS
OF LIFE: CHARACTER AND MORAL IMAGINATION IN THE NOVEL (1983); THE MORAL
IMAGINATION: How LITERATURE AND FILMS CAN STIMULATE ETHICAL REFLECTION
IN THE BUSINESS WORLD (Oliver F. Williams ed., 1997); Kirk, supra note 6. Interestingly, few authors have addressed the concept of the "moral imagination" in
the courtroom. This author believes legal scholarship and philosophy should
embrace the hope and vision of moral imagination to restore public confidence
in our system ofjustice.
12. GUROIAN, supra note 11, at 141.
13. LEDERACH, supra note 11, at 27.
14. Lederach is Professor of International Peacebuilding at the Joan B.
Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame as
well as Distinguished Scholar at Eastern Mennonite University's Conflict Transformation Program.
15. LEDERACH, supra note 11, at 27.
16.
17.

Id. at 28.
Id.
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the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges
of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that which
does not yet exist. In reference to peacebuilding, this is the
capacity to imagine and generate constructive responses
and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-day challenges of violence, transcend and ultimately
break the
18
grips of those destructive patterns and cycles.
The problem with the young defendant who appeared
before me on that Monday afternoon docket was that, like so
many others shuffled through the justice system, she was caught
in the grip of Lederach's "destructive patterns and cycles." She
did not have the capacity to "imagine and generate a constructive
response" to her situation other than to resign herself to the penitentiary. She was firmly rooted in the day-to-day challenge of violence within her own soul. She was unable to envision any
redemptive solution to the problem at hand. The same could be
said of her lawyer, the prosecutor, the probation officer, and
myself. We were all trapped within the hard, black lines of the
law where positive reason and logic compelled us to conclude
that the system had done as much as it could for this woman. The
reasonable and logical response to her circumstance and
repeated refusals to comply with terms of probation was to shelve
her in a penitentiary, thereby ostensibly placing her out of
harm's way. This was a blatantly false and forlorn hope in that we
all knew she would likely be exposed to illicit drugs in prison and
most likely would never emerge clean, straight, and sober from
the department of corrections with her overnight pass to the
Y.M.C.A. in hand. Positive black-letter law blankly presumes that
illicit drugs and alcohol are not available in prison, but this is one
more fairy tale people choose to believe for lack of broad moral
vision.
Lederach proposes that moral imagination begins with the
capacity to imagine ourselves in a web of relationships that
includes our enemies. 19 Though I hardly viewed this young
defendant as an enemy, I am certain from her standpoint, I was
something akin to an enemy. In my hands rested her future. I
symbolized the system which had reduced her sense of individuality to a commonjumpsuit, her sense of liberty to steel manacles
about her wrists, her sense of hope to a stint in a medium-security facility. To think of myself in a web of relationships that
included a woman who partnered with a motorcycle-gang leader
and recklessly used and sold dangerous drugs in the community
18.
19.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 5.
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required no small degree of humility and introspective selfregard. Such humility and personal inventory is what Lederach
20
suggests is a prerequisite to enlivening the moral imagination.
Moral imagination requires me to see something of myself in the
broken person standing before me, to see myself as being just as
broken, and just as limited by my own lack of vision. Further, I
must see myself in relation with the frustration experienced by
her attorney and the smugness demonstrated by the prosecutor.
I was tangled in a web of relationships that included all. Some
saw me as a threat. In return, I saw them as a threat. They would
likely assign a variety of descriptions to my decision dependent
on the outcome: nuts, liberal, hard-hearted, wishy-washy, pandering, soft-on-crime, etc. All of us seemed only concerned about
the end-result, not the process by which the result was to be
achieved.
Looking within, I recognized that I did, in fact, feel angry
toward this young woman because of "her" failures to comply
with probation, "her" refusal to abide by the rules I had set, "her"
weakness in just saying "no" to drugs. My impulse was to dispatch
her firmly and quickly in consequence of her seeming lack of
respect for my authority. I wanted to punish her for disappointing me; I wanted to show her where real power lies; I
wanted to limit her vistas to exactly what she had earned. I took a
deep breath preparing in my mind the litany of rationalizations
for my decision.
And then, something seized me unexpectedly, a still, small
voice from within, a restless disturbance of the conscience. Let
there be no mistake. I was not actually hearing voices. I just
sensed something in the nature of hoof-beats, of something pursuing me quietly and relentlessly. My breathing stopped, and in
my imagination I saw myself sinking to my knees beside a great
shore. I was fleeing along the shoreline, my hope for escape limited by a wild tangle of woods to one side and the crash of waves
to the other. I felt pursued and helpless in that imaginative
moment.
On the shoreline of my imagination, with my head bowed
on my knees, I became aware of the fact that my own decisions in
the past had contributed to the problem before me. When the
defendant violated probation in the past, I served up punitive jail
sentences in lockstep fashion and added additional exacting
terms of probation. In so doing, I made her recovery efforts
more onerous, more expensive, and less effective. My decisions
and her choices led her to abscond from all probation supervi20.

Id. at 35.
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sion and go on the run for months without assistance, aid, or
support. During that time, she came close to death on more than
one occasion. On the barren shoreline of that morally imaginative beach, I realized that I had failed as much as she. I was part
of the pattern, and my choices had contributed to the outcome.
As she stood before me, my curiosity deepened. The hour
was late. We had but a few minutes to say a few words before I
would remand her to the sheriffs custody to be transported to
the penitentiary. On that barren shoreline, I felt the pursing
beast begin to gnaw at the bones, opening the core structure of
things. I turned to see its face and saw nothing. I looked toward
the defendant, feeling an immediate and overwhelming curiosity, a desire to know more about this person, more than what I
could surmise from the pre-sentence reports, criminal records,
and words of the lawyers. What struck me viscerally was the fact
that I knew so little about this person whose liberty I was about to
secure for a term of years. How did she get to be here? How did it
come to this? What forces brought this woman before me, standing in the "rag-and-bone shop" of her soul, while I, perched on
high in my flowing black robes, stared down at her like an insect
to be swept from a window sill. Why was I sitting there and she
standing before me? The answers in the pre-sentence report were
unsatisfactory. Little or nothing was reported about her personal
and family background. For all I knew, she could have been
raised in a family very much like my own. Plainly, our paths at
this point in our lives were widely divergent, though I strived to
embrace the fact that we were two different souls whose paths
had now intersected in time and space. Though the lessons for
each of us were perhaps different, we both had been exposed to
human failing, misery, guilt, rejection, and sorrow in our lives.
Yes, though they would hide such sorrows within the folds of
their robes, even judges have experienced such things. I tried a
kindly, non-judgmental, inquiring voice.
"How did you come to be here?"
She struggled with her thoughts, began to say something,
and then held back refusing to return my gaze. She said nothing.
I changed my approach, again avoiding an accusatory tone.
"How did we come to be here?"
By that question, I meant to subtly convey to her that I perceived myself as an accomplice in her difficulties, that I, myself,
had made decisions which contributed to her misery, and that I
felt as confused and frustrated by the outcome as she did.
She looked up at me, nodded her head, and said, "That's a
very good question."
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She paused a moment, then said, "It's not your fault."
I shrugged my shoulders as if to say, "I'm not so sure about
that."
Thereupon began a dialogue where we shared together the
journey of her choices and my decisions. She confessed mistakes
on the street, and I apologized for misjudgments on the bench. I
invoked the possibility that each of us tried to play the hands we
were dealt, and in many instances we may have played the cards
wrong. This was an exercise in humiliation for me. I was the one
person in the room expected to have all the answers. Now we
began to dialogue on more even ground, each squarely facing
the other, the defendant and her judge, alternately offering to
bear responsibility for contributing to the breach in the web of
relationships, the web of mutual understandings that ensures the
fabric of society remains whole.
Curiosity suggests attentiveness and continuous inquiry
about things and their meaning. Etymologically, it rises
from the Latin curiosus which is formed on the word cura,
literally meaning "to take care of' and having to do with
both "cure" and "care," as in spiritual and physical healing.
From this we get terms like caregiver and curator."
Of course Lederach is not referring to morbid, snooping curiosity which causes people to inquire after their neighbor's comings
and goings. The curiosity of which he speaks is a curiosity
founded in the first instance on caring for another person, desiring to know and understand the other so as to care more deeply.
In this manner, what is not immediately perceived may become
known. This is a key to accessing the moral imagination. As I
inquired more deeply about the defendant's circumstances and
choices as well as my own complicity in the outcome, a sense of
caring emerged.
As we dialogued together, I began to sense my curiosity was
transforming into a desire to care for her, to see her to well-being
and success. Ironically, the more I inquired about her life and
background, the more I learned something of my own heart. At
some point along the way, I passed from simply making the decision to caring a great deal about making the right decision. The
clock on the courtroom wall ticked through the minutes incessandy. The gears of justice groaned, but the desire to seek
redemption, both my own and that of the defendant, surpassed
my concerns about the clock and the docket. Beneath our words,
I knew we shared a joint, deeply human curiosity, a passion to
21.

Id. at 36.
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discover the truth not only about whom we were but also about
whom we were meant to be. This required each of us to suspend
previous judgments about one another. I had to move beyond
seeing her as a "felon on the run." She had to move beyond seeing me as the gatekeeper to the penitentiary. We must move into
a different sphere of understanding.
This different sphere of understanding is the moral imagination where solutions other than the most apparent emerge. This
sphere invites acts of imagination, creativity, and risk. I asked the
defendant:
"What do you suggest I do? What would you do if you were
me?"
Embarrassed by the question, the defendant sputtered,
"Well, you gotta do what you gotta do. I guess I'm goin' to
prison."
"I'm not so sure," I said in response.
Then I waited silently, awaiting not only her response but
more the response from deep within me. In my Christian spiritual tradition, I happen to believe in the existence of a great
parade of saints who have gone before, and whose cumulative
wisdom may be drawn upon at any given time. It is simply available for the asking. Science informs us that carbon, the essential
ingredient of life on earth, comes in the first instance from the
stars. The carbon in the bones of the saints was made from stars,
and like the saints, I too come from the stars. So also did this
broken woman who stood before me. She came from the stars.
We are all born of stars. Sucking star energy into a courtroom on
a Monday afternoon near the close of a ninety-case docket seems
like nonsense. But the restraints and constraints of that courtroom bespoke pending acts of violence, violence to the human
spirit, to human life. I was on the verge of casting away a life. At
core, violence is anti-life. Here in the courtroom, one encounters
a type of clamped-down, time-slaved, metaphorical violence. I
envisioned the two of us, both the defendant and myself now,
standing together on that barren shoreline between the tangled
thicket and the pounding surf, back-to-back, looking outward,
holding anti-life forces at bay.
At the periphery of my vision, I saw restless attorneys, anxious for their cases to be called, impatient with my oblique dialogue with the defendant. I felt the pressure of time, but I
needed space and silence, a moment to be alone with the stars
and the saints. In the rush of that hell-bent, Monday-afternoon
docket I understood Edmund Burke's lament at the loss of those
"superadded ideas, furnished from the wardrobe of a moral
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imagination. '22 If I could only reach into the closet, just this
once, what would I find in the wardrobe of moral imagination?
Lederach instructs that the skill of an "artist" is required to
breathe the possibility of life into a barren and desolate landscape. He admonishes those seeking to access moral imagination
to "[b] e attentive to image. Listen for the core. Trust and follow
intuition. Watch metaphor. Avoid clutter and busy-ness. See picture better. Find the elegant beauty where complexity meets simplicity. Imagine the canvas of social change." 23 Acts of creativity
and intuition necessarily involve risk. The art of judging is all
about risk, conceptualizing problems and issues in a manner few
others understand, paying attention as much to the periphery of
one's vision as to what is directly in front of one's eyes. The process involves listening more than anything-listening not just to
words but also to one's own heart. That is a risky business in a
court of law, one perhaps contemplated by the fathers and
mothers of our country who envisioned the dissolution of political relationships in their earnest bid for freedom. In so doing,
they did not simply invoke the strident black-letter laws of man,
but they referenced in their great Declaration of Independence
the "laws of nature and of nature's God. ' 24 These restless and
risky visionaries contemplated a country with spiritual vision, and
I question whether they intended to suspend such vision in their
courts of justice.
Lederach's treatise on the moral imagination cautions us
about the risk of ventures into that realm.
The final discipline at the essence of the moral imagination can be described simply but requires heart and soul
and defies prescription: the willingness to take a risk. To
risk is to step into the unknown without any guarantee of
success or even safety. Risk by its very nature is mysterious.
It is mystery lived, for it ventures into lands that are not
controlled or charted. People living in settings of deeprooted conflict are faced with an extraordinary irony. Violence is known; peace is the mystery. By its very nature,
therefore, peacebuilding requires a journey guided by the
imagination of risk. 25
As I meditated on the defendant's life and future, I thought
about the risks. Perhaps she would be killed as a result of my
decision. That could occur whether I sentenced her to the peni22.
23.
24.
25.

BuRKE, supra note 2, at 239.
LEDERACH, supra note 11, at 74.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
LEDERACH, supra note 11, at 39.

20081

A "MORE EXCELLENT WAY"

tentiary or placed her closer to the streets. The chances were
good that if I allowed her near the streets again she would die.
She confessed this to me herself. She was riding a rocket-sled to
oblivion and making pretty good time. The penitentiary, in many
ways, would be a safer choice. Perhaps she would sort things out
behind bars. I sensed that was the general consensus of the
room.
But something from within prompted me to eschew common "reason" and the "logical" choice. I began reciting the facts
supporting my decision, all of which led inexorably to a department of corrections choice. Then suddenly, I found myself
switching direction as I spoke, telling the defendant that I
refused to give up on her, that I refused to bend to those forces
that prompted her to beg that I place her in the penitentiary. I
told her that despite all that she had done, I believed she still
desired to discover the truth of her life, the truth about herself,
and that the truth about whom she was meant to be. I tried to
explain that the desire I sensed within her transcended all the
tragic mistakes and misjudgments that had brought her before
me at the end of that rowdy, crowded afternoon. I told her that
at some deep level, I simply trusted her to find her way through
the thickets and brambles so she could begin creating her life
anew in accord with the dignity due to one born of the stars.
No doubt most people in the courtroom that day were baffled, and I would have shrunk in embarrassment if I had heard
comments about me in the courthouse hallway beyond the doors
of the courtroom. I also knew, however, that a human life was at
stake, and I had this overwhelming sense that this person was as
desperate as I in her search for peace and truth in life. I was also
hoping this would result in an act of redemption near the end of
that rancorous and unforgiving afternoon. I refused the prosecutor's request to send her to the penitentiary. I sentenced her
instead to a community-based corrections program where she
would again, despite her previous refusal to participate, be given
the opportunity to enter a drug rehabilitation program. I understood the decision involved risk, the risk that I may have handed
down a virtual death-sentence to this young woman, death
through a self-inflicted drug overdose or death at the hands of
those other desperados who supplied her needs on the needleinfested streets.
As she was led from the courtroom to begin her sentence, I
silently whispered to myself, "Our Father, who art in
Heaven .

. . ."

She looked at me curiously, confused as she was

being led through the door in the wall into the holding cell and
elevator which would take her to the jail and her eventual place-
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ment in community corrections. Her glance was unnerving, as if
to say, "You idiot, do you have any idea what you are doing?" I
felt a great discomfiture. I had just broken almost all of the
unwritten rules.
When Edmund Burke spoke of "the moral imagination" he
decried the loss of civilization at the hands of those who had no
respect for the rules. He excoriated revolutionary rule-breakers.
Burke was not about breaking rules. I feel the same, and I even
felt the same that auspicious day. I recognize the importance of
the rule of law and routinely lecture prospective jurors on the
importance of the rule of law. I also understand that the rule of
law goes only so far. What is a judge to do in those white-hell
spaces between the lines, those margins between the structures,
where the prescribed solutions are not so obvious as black letters
on white paper. I submit that in those liminal zones, if one is
open to risk and creativity, something in the moral imagination
may find air to breathe in a court of law. Those moments may
not be planned. They are a creature of art as much as logic. The
moral imagination is serendipitous and spontaneous. One must
be willing to take the risk without a great deal of forethought or
reflection. The moments do not last for long. When an opportunity presents itself, one must act swiftly or they will lose the
opportunity in an instant.
Much more can be said about this topic. I welcome the
reader's review of the burgeoning body of literature concerning
"the moral imagination."2 6 I doubt that any one source may be
relied upon to clarify thoroughly and competently the meaning
and implications of moral imagination in the new millennium. I
have chosen to rely on Lederach's work because I believe I see
analogies between his work as a peace-keeper in the world of
international conflict and ajudge's work in the conflicted, adversarial zone of a courtroom. I praise Lederach for his vision,
reflecting as noble and civilized an impulse as any I have known.
His actions and his words lend dignity to Burke's phrase, "the
moral imagination." My own contribution to the literature on
this subject is nothing more than the splash of a small pebble on
the surface of a great, blue sea-the sea of moral imagination. I
commend each of you to seek what lies near the borders of the
structures that be, the accepted notions of the way things are. I
commend you to listen closely to the silence, to wait, to watch,
and to respond fearlessly when the moment arrives. Therein, I
trust, you will find a more excellent way.
26.

See supra note 11.
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EPILOGUE

Four years following the date of the incident described
above, I was sitting alone at the bench in Courtroom 5A, Division
2, Jefferson County, Colorado. The morning's activities had been
concluded, the lawyers had left, and I was quietly straightening
up the bench before leaving for lunch. I heard someone pushing
the double-door latch at the back of the courtroom. Looking up
I saw a door swing open and a young woman walk into the courtroom. She was dressed modestly but professionally in business
attire, and her hair was perfectly coifed. She walked confidently
down the center aisle without saying a word, her chin held high,
looking directly at me. I stared back impatiently, neither smiling
nor greeting, so as to convey the message that she should mind
courtroom boundaries. She seemed, however, at ease in the surroundings, holding my gaze steadily, undaunted by the prospect
of confronting a sitting judge who was in the "do not disturb"
mood. I presumed she was a lawyer bent on asking an ex parte
favor. I remained on guard.
She came to the end of the center aisle, stopping at the well
of the courtroom, standing quietly and expectantly, as if waiting
for me to say something. I said nothing. I bluntly stared back at
her. An awkward silence followed wherein neither of us said anything. Then she asked, "Your Honor, do you remember me?" I
have been asked this question hundreds of times over the years. I
have heard it in the courthouse halls, on the street, and in stores
and restaurants. I always find the question embarrassing because
I do not have a particularly acute memory for names or faces.
More often than not, I confess confusion and mumble an inept
apology. At this juncture, enjoying some peace and privacy at the
bench, I was not feeling particularly apologetic. Anxious to get to
lunch, I was not in the mood to play memory games with this
woman. Something, however, struck me as being vaguely familiar
about the woman, something about her eyes, the square of her
jaw, that struck a memory chord. I looked closer now, a storm
surge of recognition rising from the pit of my stomach.
It was her. Her name, long forgotten or suppressed, suddenly crashed against the forefront of my consciousness. "I know
who you are," I said slowly, deliberately, and steadily. Then I pronounced her name. In doing so I felt a certain apprehension.
Was I right? Could this be the same person? I felt a twinge of fear
awaiting her response. If this was the same person, why was she
standing here before me? Had she come to scold me, to tell me
how wrong I had been? Was she here to do worse? Instinctively,
my hand moved beneath the bench toward the emergency alert
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button, the button which would bring at least half a dozen armed
sheriffs deputies within seconds. I had only pushed it once in
ten years on the bench, and that was when I accidentally pushed
it during the course of a trial. That, however, is another story, an
amusing one to be sure, but only after the fact.
The woman suddenly beamed at me. "You remember!" she
half-shouted, clutching her hands together and raising them as if
in spontaneous prayer.
I smiled back at her. "Yes," I said smiling, "I remember you."
"I have something to show you, something I want you to
see!"
"Alright," I said unhurriedly, "Let's see what you've got."
She reached into a large purse hanging from her shoulder
and produced an oversized envelope. Gripping it in both hands,
she inquired, "May I approach the bench, your Honor?"
"Of course you may."
She marched quickly to the bench, stretched forth her
hands with the envelope and said, "Look inside."
I opened the envelope, feeling that same old curiosity.
Reaching inside, I withdrew a document, a single document on
heavy-stock paper. Holding it carefully beneath the soft light of
the bench lamp, I found I could hardly breathe. I stared at the
document, afraid if I dared to look at this woman I might unjudiciously burst into tears. Even as I write these words, my eyes fill
with tears recalling the moment. The seal, the carefully spaced
lines, the brilliant black letters on parchment paper, the gorgeous calligraphic swoops and curves of the lettering, the date,
the official signatures and titles, all verifying to me the accomplishment of something not merely significant, but something
truly heroic. In my hands, I held a Bachelor of Arts Degree
diploma from a distinguished state university, and emblazoned
on that degree was the name of this erstwhile ex-felon. She stood
radiantly before me.
"I don't know what to say," I stuttered, shaking my head in
disbelief.
"You don't need to say anything," she replied calmly and
evenly. 'You did your part, and I did mine. Ijust wanted to thank
you personally." She smiled up at me, and said, "I should also tell
you I have been accepted into a Masters in Business Administration program." Her smile widened.
"Oh my gosh," I sputtered, "will you invite me to your
graduation?"
She laughed, "Of course I will, but do you have a few minutes before then? I would like to tell you my story."
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"My time is yours," I said without hesitation.
She then told me her story, how she had left the courtroom
that day in handcuffs to be delivered to the community corrections facility, how she had resented the fact that I had ignored
her request to 'Just send her away," how she had actively resisted
the efforts of those in community corrections to get back into
drug treatment, and how one day, out of sheer boredom she had
finally decided to go to a meeting because the old judge refused
to believe she was done with her life. The rest of her story is
remarkable, in the truest sense a heroic journey of the heart and
will. Her story, like so many others must await another time and
place, but having heard her testimony concerning thatjourney, I
can attest to it being a breathtakingly beautiful testimony to the
relentlessness struggle of the human soul for peace, reconciliation, and redemption.
These days we occasionally contact each other through correspondence or telephone chats. We retouch the reality of the
past as if to make sure it was not just a dream. She has become a
personal friend of my family. Almost eight years have passed
since the day when she sauntered into Courtroom 5A, confused
and resentful. I am delighted to report that she has achieved an
outstanding position in sales with a company whose compassion
and generosity in hiring a convicted felon can only be praised. In
a state where tight-chested fear has prompted legislation that
precludes convicted felons from having their records expunged
or sealed, it takes nothing short of moral imagination for a company to welcome as employees people who made mistakes once
upon a time, but who have fearlessly moved beyond those
choices. I have learned so much from such brave, young hearts
over the course of years.
Moral imagination, Lederach reminds us, involves a risk "to
step into the unknown without any guarantee of success or even
safety."2 7 I understand his words. I have lived them. I have taken
risks and failed, even failed miserably. I do not consider myself a
particularly lucky person, but once upon a time I was a judge. i
don't know that I was a particularly good judge. I did, however,
dream one day of doing my job in a more excellent way. The
path was not always pleasant. I took risks. In some instances I
paid the price, but even for this one woman's life alone, all the
risks were worthwhile. I have lived the mystery. I have no regrets.
I took risks, some of which upon reflection I should not have
taken, but none of which I regret. I commend to you thejourney,
a redemption journey in lands neither designed nor suited for
27.

LEDERACH,

supra note 11, at 39.
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peace or redemption, where the inhabitants thrive on conflict
Therein lies the irony; therein lies the moral
and division.
28
vision.

28. To a certain extent I have taken liberties in fictionalizing facts or
time-compressing details concerning the events and lengthy legal proceedings
involving the defendant and myself. This is necessary for two reasons. First, I
wish to protect the defendant's privacy from unwarranted intrusion. As a convicted felon, she faces almost insurmountable difficulties in proceeding
through life despite what I deem to be her complete rehabilitation. I have no
wish to make her life more difficult than it is by revealing facts which could be
revelatory of her identity. Second, the lengthy and involved series of court proceedings leading to the eventual conclusion of her relationship with the criminal justice system requires further compression of time and fact to spare the
reader needless and unnecessary details about procedural minutia. I have
requested my defendant friend to review this account, and she has granted me
permission to submit this story to you. She says, "Yeah, that's pretty much the
way it went down." She then smiles, shakes her head and laughs, saying, "Can
you believe it?" I am most thankful to her. I have learned so much more from
her than I could ever hope to teach her. She has essentially taught me what it
means to be a judge.

